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Abstract 
There has long been a deep-rooted view that economic rents are foremost among the 
origins of high levels of economic inequality. In this paper, economic rents generated by 
ranking preference are examined as an important source of widening inequality based on 
the concept of sustainable heterogeneity. Ranking preference generates widespread and 
large monopoly rents across an economy because they can be obtained through firms’ 
product differentiations, but this topic has not been studied as a source of economic 
inequality. This paper shows that these monopoly rents can greatly accelerate economic 
inequality because access to these rents is intrinsically heterogeneous among households 
and are unevenly distributed and persistent. Nevertheless, if a government appropriately 
intervenes, the acceleration of inequality can be prevented.  
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Numerous empirical studies have concluded that income inequality has increased in many 
countries since the 1980s (Piketty, 2003, 2013; Piketty and Saez, 2003; Atkinson et al., 
2011; Parker, 2014). In addition, within-country wealth inequality has increased in many 
countries in the same period (Piketty, 2013; Saez and Zucman, 2016). Several 
explanations for the recent increase in income inequality have been presented. Among 
them, “skill-biased technological change” (SBTC) was the most favored explanation until 
the early 2000s (Katz and Murphy, 1992; Autor et al., 1998, 2003). However, SBTC has 
not been sufficiently supported empirically (Card and DiNardo, 2002). On the other hand, 
explanations based on globalization have also been widely accepted; in particular, those 
based on the Stolper–Samuelson theorem (Stolper and Samuelson, 1941) were favored 
before the 21th century. These explanations were also not sufficiently supported 
empirically (Leamer, 1998; Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007) in the 2000s, so the main 
underlying mechanisms of globalization-based explanations changed to heterogeneity of 
firms, labor market frictions, and offshoring of tasks (Helpman, 2016). In addition, 
Pickety (2013) argued that the increases in income and wealth inequalities can be 
attributed to uneven capital accumulation across households. 
 Why, however, have high levels of economic inequality arisen in the first place? 
Various kinds of explanations for the origin of inequality have been presented (e.g., 
Kuznets, 1955; Boix, 2010; Pickety, 2013; Milanovic, 2016). It seems highly unlikely 
that the huge income gaps that have been observed among people in many countries can 
be explained by arguing that they are simply reflecting proportional differences in 
people’s absolute abilities. Rather, there has been a deep-rooted view that wealthy persons, 
from the start, have exclusionary sources of wealth (i.e., economic rents), and these rents 
are foremost among the origins of high levels of economic inequality (Stiglitz, 2015a, 
2015b, 2015c, 2015d). If economic rents are left as they are, inequalities in income and 
wealth will accelerate and eventually reach an extreme level, but economic rents may be 
less important economically today than they were in the past. In developed countries, 
monopolies are strictly regulated. Oil and other natural resource rents may no longer play 
a significantly important role in the degree of inequality within countries, except in some 
resource-rich developing countries. Regardless, it is undeniable that there are still 
significant income and wealth inequalities in many countries today. Stiglitz (2015d) 
argued that “exploitation rents” are another type of economic rent that contribute to 
inequality, although his arguments are narrative and remain suggestive.  
 Harashima (2016, 2018b) introduced a different type of economic rent that had 
not been discussed previously: monopoly profits (rents) derived from people’s ranking 
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preference. These rents enable some players or artists to be superstars in the sport, art, 
and music industries (Harashima, 2016, 2018a, 2018b) and enable some corporate 
executives to earn extremely high compensations (Harashima, 2018c). In addition, 
ranking preference is an important element in product differentiation, which provides 
large amounts of monopoly rents to companies (Harashima, 2017b). Because the strategy 
of product differentiation is one of the most important strategies a company uses to 
prosper (Porter, 1980, 1985) and has been intensely pursued by many companies, 
monopoly rents derived from product differentiations owing to ranking preference are 
highly likely to prevail widely, ubiquitously, and massively across economies. In addition, 
directly regulating monopoly powers stemming from ranking preference would be 
significantly harmful to an economy (Harashima, 2018c); therefore, these powers have 
not been directly regulated and will not be in the future. Because they are so widespread 
and large and are not directly regulated, they are economically very important, not only 
today but also into the future. Another important feature of this type of monopoly rent is 
that access to them is highly likely to be heterogeneous among households. Accessibility 
will depend on the relative differences in abilities of people who make up each household. 
As a result, many of these monopoly rents will be enjoyed only by a small number of 
households and family lines, meaning that the monopoly rents will be distributed very 
unevenly. Hence, this type of monopoly rent can be an important origin of high levels of 
economic inequality. The purpose of this paper is to examine this possibility and what a 
government should do if monopoly rents are really an important origin of the high level 
of economic inequality that is currently observed.  
 The possibility of widening inequality and the role of government to prevent it 
are examined on the basis of the concept of “sustainable heterogeneity” (SH) presented 
by Harashima (2010, 2012, 2017a). In this context, heterogeneity is defined as being 
sustainable if all optimality conditions of all heterogeneous households are satisfied 
indefinitely. In an economy in which households are heterogeneous in time preference 
and risk aversion, SH is achieved if all households behave multilaterally, but not if 
advantaged households behave unilaterally unless a government appropriately intervenes. 
Conversely, if a government appropriately intervenes, SH can be achieved even if 
households behave unilaterally. In this paper, Harashima’s (2010, 2012, 2017a) models, 
which assume an environment in which households receive only labor and capital 
incomes, are extended to include an environment in which households also receive 
economic rents. I show that a government has to intervene with regard to unevenly 
distributed economic rents as well as other heterogeneities to achieve SH. Because 
monopoly rents resulting from ranking preference are economically important and 
unevenly distributed, the government’s responsibility to prevent widening inequality by 
taking appropriate actions is also important.  
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2  ECONOMIC RENTS 
 
2.1  Conventional economic rents 
There are various kinds of economic rents—for example, benefits that accrue from natural 
resource or land ownership, corruption, monopolies, and patents. In the past, economic 
rents seem to have been an important source of income of wealthy people and therefore 
also to have been an essential origin of economic inequality. However, they may be far 
less important economically today for a variety of reasons. Monopolies are now strictly 
regulated in most developed countries. Corruption is still a serious problem in many 
developing countries, but it may no longer be as economically important in many 
developed countries. Although oil and other natural resource rents are still important in 
some resource-rich developing countries, they may not play an important role in the 
degree of inequality in developed countries, because incomes from labor and capital are 
far larger. Patents remain important, but they are constrained by patent periods, and more 
importantly, creating profitable patents requires a large research investment.  
   
 
2.2  Monopoly rent from ranking 
Harashima (2016, 2018b) introduced the concept of ranking value and preference and 
showed that some people can obtain much higher incomes than ordinary people because 
ranking value and preference generate monopoly powers. Thanks to these monopoly 
powers, producers can obtain economic rents (profits). Because the concept of the ranking 
value of preference is new, this type of economic rent has not previously been studied or 
considered as a contributor to economic inequality.  
 Harashima (2017b) showed that ranking preference plays an important role in 
product differentiation, and the monopoly rents obtained from product differentiation 
resulting from ranking preference are essential for a firm’s prosperity. Because the 
strategy of product differentiation is one of the most important for companies (Porter, 
1980, 1985) and is actually pursed by many companies, the monopoly rents generated 
from differentiation will be large and widespread across the economy today and in the 
future. Furthermore, Harashima (2016, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c) showed that these 
monopoly rents will be distributed very unevenly within a firm, team, or organization. In 
particular, they will be distributed largely to a few relatively more talented persons; this 
has the potential to generate a high level of inequality.   
 
2.2.1  Ranking value and preference 
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The concept of ranking value and preference is briefly explained in this section. Two 
kinds of value are considered: practical value and ranking value. Practical value is the 
value that people feel when consuming a good or service for practical purposes. Ranking 
value is the value that people feel from the rank of a good or service in a set of similar 
types of goods or services that people use, possess, or observe. In other words, ranking 
value is the value people place on goods or services on the basis of their ranks (e.g., the 
ranking of a book on a best-seller list or that of a baseball team in a professional league). 
 Goods and services have three properties: quantity, quality, and ranking. Quality 
is related to practical value, ranking is related to ranking value, and quantity is related to 
both. Suppose that the quality and ranking of each good or service are given exogenously 
and fixed. Here, for simplicity, I assume that there is only one type of good or service in 
the economy (these goods or services are hereafter called “goods”), and that all goods 
belong to this type and are substitutable for each other for households’ practical uses. 
Although the goods are substitutable from the point of view of practical uses, they are 
differentiated from the point of view of ranking.  
 Let R (= 1, 2, 3, …) be the rank of goods. The good with R = 1 is most preferred 
by households; R = 2 indicates the next most preferred, and so on. For simplicity, no tied 
ranks are assumed. A household’s utility derived from consuming the good with rank R 
is  
 
𝑢(𝑞𝑛,𝑅 , 𝑞𝑙,𝑅 , 𝑅) 
 
where qn,R and ql,R are the quantity and quality of the good with rank R, respectively. For 
simplicity, the utility of the household is modified to  
 
𝑢(?̃?𝑅 , 𝑅) 
 
where
Rq
~ is the “quality-adjusted quantity” of the good with rank R, and
l,Rn,RR qqq 
~ .  
 The utility function has the following conventional characteristics: 
 
𝜕𝑢(?̃?𝑅 , 𝑅)
𝜕?̃?𝑅
> 0 
 
and 
 
 
𝜕2𝑢(?̃?𝑅 , 𝑅)
𝜕?̃?𝑅
2 < 0 . 
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In addition, for any Rr ,  
 
𝑢(?̃?𝑟 , 𝑟 + 1) < 𝑢(?̃?𝑟 , 𝑟) 
 
and 
 
 𝑢(?̃?𝑟 , 𝑟 + 2) − 𝑢(?̃?𝑟 , 𝑟 + 1) > 𝑢(?̃?𝑟 , 𝑟 + 1) − 𝑢(?̃?𝑟, 𝑟) . 
 
2.2.2  Implicit ranking 
Although some goods and services have explicit rankings (e.g., a book on a best-seller 
list), most goods and services do not because there is no open or formal competition 
among them. However, it is highly likely that people still feel a sense of ranking, possibly 
unconsciously, from many goods and services because they usually want to know which 
products most people are paying attention to and to buy the products that are the most 
popular and well known. Fame is valuable because it provides information about “implicit 
rankings” and generates a sense of ranking. Because implicit rankings are formed 
essentially on the basis of information about which product is preferred and sold, they do 
not represent an individual household’s unique and personal rankings; rather, they are 
socially and widely recognized rankings. That is, implicit rankings basically represent the 
common knowledge of all households.   
 
2.2.3  Monopoly power and rent from ranking 
Ranking value and preference provide monopoly powers to the producers of high-ranked 
goods and services because selling ranking value to consumers requires no additional 
cost; that is, the marginal cost of producing a ranking value is zero, and thereby such 
producers can set prices above their marginal costs. Hence, they can obtain monopoly 
profits (rents). I call this type of monopoly rents “ranking monopoly rents”—that is, they 
are the monopoly rents derived from ranking. As Harashima (2017b) showed, the strategy 
of product differentiation is particularly important for obtaining these monopoly rents. 
There are numerous kinds of products, and numerous firms pursue ranking monopoly 
rents by differentiating their products, which means that ranking monopoly rents are 
widespread and large across the entire economy.  
 Who receives the ranking monopoly rents: shareholders, ordinary employees, 
consumers, or executives? It may be reasonable that those who contribute to the 
generation of ranking monopoly rents obtain a portion equal to the extent of their 
contribution, but it is difficult to judge who contributes to the generation of these rents 
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and how much they contribute. Hence, in some cases, ranking monopoly rents may be 
mostly distributed to a few persons within a company (e.g., its owners or executives). 
 Individuals who do not obtain ranking monopoly rents suffer decreases in their 
labor and capital incomes because the total production (total income) in an economy does 
not increase as a result of the generation of ranking monopoly rents (i.e., people are in a 
situation that can be represented as a zero-sum game). In other words, to compensate for 
the ranking monopoly rents distributed to some people, the incomes of other persons must 
be reduced by the same amount directly or indirectly through lower wages or higher prices. 
Therefore, some amount of income from one group of households is transferred to, or 
exploited by, people in the other group (i.e., those who receive the ranking monopoly 
rents).  
 An important nature of ranking monopoly rents is that it is likely that some 
particular family lines will obtain them and, conversely, the incomes of some other family 
lines will consistently be reduced. To be in the position to obtain ranking monopoly rents, 
some types of special abilities—particularly higher abilities than those of ordinary 
people—will be necessary. Because of the nature of heredity, some family lines may have 
higher probabilities of having such abilities and thereby obtaining the rents. These family 
lines may obtain monopoly rents “persistently” in the sense that the mean of monopoly 
rents they obtain over generations is positive. In addition, the distribution of the ranking 
monopoly rents generated in a company may be inherited; that is, the power to control or 
influence the company (and the distributions) may pass from generation to generation in 
a specific family line. If no tax, such as an inheritance tax, is imposed, a private company 
will likely continue to be owned by a family line persistently. Hence, there will not only 
be “temporary” ranking monopoly rents for some individuals, but also “persistent” 
ranking monopoly rents for some family lines.  
 Furthermore, because different family lines most likely have different 
probabilities of obtaining economic rents persistently and obtain different amounts of 
these rents, we can construct a model in which there are heterogeneous infinitely living 
households (i.e., family lines) whose economic rents are heterogeneous, similar to the 
models in which there are heterogeneous time preferences, risk aversions, and/or 
productivities in infinitely living households, as shown by Harashima (2010, 2012, 
2017a).  
 As noted previously, monopoly rents are highly likely to be unevenly distributed. 
Moreover, these uneven distributions are likely to persist over time. The distribution of 
ranking monopoly rents has another important nature, however. Even if these rents are 
collected by a government as taxes, the amount of these rents generated in the economy 
does not change, because the efforts of executives of firms are irrelevant to the utilities 
that households eventually obtain from ranking values. In other words, the underlying 
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economic activities are not disturbed even if these rents are collected and redistributed by 
government. Harashima (2018c) indicated that ranking monopoly rents derived from 
ranking values themselves can be socially justified, but the uneven distributions of these 
rents (e.g., the distribution of most of these rents to executives) cannot necessarily be 
socially justified because a household’s ranking preference is not related to the absolute 
abilities of the highly compensated executives; rather, the ranking is related to the 
executive’s (or player’s) relative abilities. The utilities households derive from ranking 
values are not affected by the historical level of absolute abilities of executives. Hence, 
even if the motivation of executives to work harder is enhanced through a high level of 
compensation, their enhanced efforts are irrelevant to the utilities that households 
eventually obtain from ranking values.  
 
3  SUSTAINABLE HETEROGENEITY 
 
The conditions for SH are briefly explained in this section on the basis of the work of 
Harashima (2010, 2012, 2017a). 
 
3.1  The model of SH 
Suppose for simplicity that there are only two economies―Economy 1 and Economy 2—
that are identical except for time preference. Each economy consists of identical 
households. Let θ1 and θ2 be the rates of time preference of households in Economies 1 
and 2, respectively, and θ1 < θ2. The population growth rate is zero in both economies. 
The two economies are fully open to each other, and goods, services, and capital are freely 
transacted between them, but labor is immobilized in each economy. Because the 
economies are fully open, they are integrated through trade and form a combined 
economy. The combined economy can be interpreted as the world economy (the 
international interpretation) or the national economy (the national interpretation). Usually, 
the concept of the balance of payments is used only for the international transactions, but 
because both national and international interpretations are possible, this concept and 
terminology are also used for the national economy model in this paper. 
 Because a balanced growth path requires Harrod neutral technological progress, 
the production function of Economy i is assumed to be  
 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡
𝛼𝑘𝑖,𝑡
1−𝛼 
 
for i = 1 or 2 where yi,t and ki,t are the per capita production and capital of Economy i in 
period t, respectively; At is the technology in period t; and α ( 0 < α < 1) is a constant. The 
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current account balance in Economy 1 is τt and that in Economy 2 is – τt. The accumulated 
current account balance 
 
∫ 𝜏𝑠𝑑𝑠
𝑡
0
 
 
mirrors capital flows between the two economies. The economy with current account 
surpluses invests them in the other economy. Since 
𝜕𝑦1,𝑡
𝜕𝑘1,𝑡
 (=
𝜕𝑦2,𝑡
𝜕𝑘2,𝑡
) are returns on 
investments,  
 
𝜕𝑦1,𝑡
𝜕𝑘1,𝑡
∫ 𝜏𝑠𝑑𝑠
𝑡
0
  and  
𝜕𝑦2,𝑡
𝜕𝑘2,𝑡
∫ 𝜏𝑠𝑑𝑠
𝑡
0
  
 
represent income receipts or payments on the assets that an economy owns in the other 
economy. Hence,  
 
𝜏𝑡 −
𝜕𝑦2,𝑡
𝜕𝑘2,𝑡
∫ 𝜏𝑠𝑑𝑠
𝑡
0
 
 
is the balance on goods and services of Economy 1, and  
 
𝜕𝑦1,𝑡
𝜕𝑘1,𝑡
∫ 𝜏𝑠𝑑𝑠
𝑡
0
− 𝜏𝑡 
 
is that of Economy 2. Because the current account balance mirrors capital flows between 
the economies, the balance is a function of capital in both economies such that  
 
 𝜏𝑡 = 𝜅(𝑘1,𝑡, 𝑘2,𝑡) . 
 
 The government (or an international supranational organization under the 
international interpretation) can intervene in economic activities in Economies 1 and 2 by 
transferring money between the two economies. The transfer amount from households in 
Economy 1 to households in Economy 2 in period t is gt, and it is assumed that gt depends 
on capital such that  
 
 g
𝑡
= g̅
𝑡
𝑘1,𝑡 . 
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g̅
𝑡
 is an exogenous variable for households and firms and is appropriately adjusted by the 
government (or an international supranational organization) in every period so as to 
achieve SH. Because 𝑘1,𝑡 = 𝑘2,𝑡 and ?̇?1,𝑡 = ?̇?2,𝑡, 
 
 g
𝑡
= g̅
𝑡
𝑘1,𝑡 = g̅𝑡𝑘2,𝑡 . 
 
 Each household in Economy 1 maximizes its expected utility 
 
𝐸 ∫ 𝑢1(𝑐1,𝑡)exp
∞
0
(−𝜃1𝑡)𝑑𝑡 
 
subject to 
 
 
𝑑𝑘1,𝑡
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴𝛼𝑘1,𝑡
1−𝛼 − 𝑐1,𝑡 + (1 − 𝛼)𝐴
𝛼𝑘1,𝑡
−𝛼 (∫ 𝜏𝑠
𝑡
0
𝑑𝑠 + 𝑧0) − 𝜏𝑡 − g̅𝑡𝑘1,𝑡 , 
 
and each household in Economy 2 maximizes its expected utility 
 
𝐸 ∫ 𝑢2(𝑐2,𝑡)exp
∞
0
(−𝜃2𝑡)𝑑𝑡 
 
subject to 
 
 
𝑑𝑘2,𝑡
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴𝛼𝑘2,𝑡
1−𝛼 − 𝑐2,𝑡 − (1 − 𝛼)𝐴
𝛼𝑘2,𝑡
−𝛼 (∫ 𝜏𝑠
𝑡
0
𝑑𝑠 + 𝑧0) + 𝜏𝑡 + g̅𝑡𝑘2,𝑡 , 
 
where ci, t is the per capita consumption of Economy i in period t, ui is the utility function 
of Economy i, and E is the expectation operator. 
 
3.2  SH 
In an endogenous growth model, Harashima (2010, 2017a) showed that if, and only if, 
lim
𝑡→∞
?̇?1,𝑡
𝑐1,𝑡
 = lim
𝑡→∞
?̇?2,𝑡
𝑐2,𝑡
 = constant, all the optimality conditions of both economies are 
satisfied (i.e., SH is achieved). In addition, if Economy 1 behaves multilaterally in the 
sense that it behaves fully considering the optimality conditions of Economy 2, SH is 
achieved, but if Economy 1 behaves unilaterally in the sense that it behaves without 
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regarding the optimality conditions of Economy 2, SH is not achieved unless a 
government appropriately intervenes. If SH is achieved, the growth rates of consumption 
in both economies are equally  
 
lim
𝑡→∞
?̇?1,𝑡
𝑐1,𝑡
= lim
𝑡→∞
?̇?2,𝑡
𝑐2,𝑡
= 𝜀−1 [(
𝜛𝛼
𝑚v
)
𝛼
(1 − 𝛼)−𝛼 −
𝜃1 + 𝜃2
2
]  ,                  (1) 
where m, v, and 𝜛 are positive constants, and 𝜀 = −
𝑐1,𝑡𝑢1
′′
𝑢1
′
 = −
𝑐2,𝑡𝑢2
′′
𝑢2
′
 is the degree of 
relative risk aversion and is constant. 
 Note that Harashima (2010, 2017a) showed that this model can be easily 
extended to multi-economy (i.e., more than two economies) models and that the results 
in multi-economy models are basically the same as those in the two-economy model. 
 
3.3  Government intervention 
Harashima (2012) showed that if a government intervenes such that 
 
 lim
𝑡→∞
g̅
𝑡
=
𝜃2 − 𝜃1
2
 , 
 
then SH is achieved even if Economy 1 behaves unilaterally, and equation (1) is satisfied. 
 
4  SH WITH RENT INCOME 
 
As discussed in Section 2, some households can obtain economic rents or equivalently 
rent incomes and some cannot (i.e., they are heterogeneous). Hence, we can construct a 
heterogeneous rent income model similar to the heterogeneous time preference model 
shown in Section 3; this also applies to the heterogeneous risk aversion and productivity 
models shown by Harashima (2010, 2012, 2017a).  
 Suppose that there are only two economies, Economies 1 and 2, which are 
identical except for rates of time preference (θ1 < θ2) and the rent incomes they obtain. 
Households within each economy are identical. As shown in Section 2, some households 
can obtain rent incomes at the expense of decreases in incomes of other households. 
Suppose that households in Economy 1 obtain rent incomes—particularly ranking 
monopoly rents. In addition, all of them obtain the same amount of rent income 
simultaneously when they obtain rent income. Conversely, if households in Economy 1 
obtain rent incomes, the income of a household in Economy 2 is reduced by the amount 
a household in Economy 1 obtains. Finally, households in Economy 1 may receive rent 
incomes only once in a certain period, but they may obtain them in every period.  
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4.1  SH with temporary rent income 
To start, in this section I examine the case where households in Economy 1 obtain rent 
incomes only once (i.e., a temporary rent income).  
 
4.1.1 Consumption growth 
Suppose that each household in Economy 1 obtains rent income z0 in period 0 at the 
expense of a reduction of income of each household in Economy 2 by z0 in period 0. 
Suppose for simplicity that a household in Economy 1 does not consume the rent income 
z0 but lends the money equivalent to zt to a household in Economy 2 in period 0. Each 
household in Economy 1 lends this money to only one household in Economy 2. 
 Each household in Economy 1 maximizes its expected utility 
 
𝐸 ∫ 𝑢1(𝑐1,𝑡)exp
∞
0
(−𝜃1𝑡)𝑑𝑡 
 
subject to 
 
 
𝑑𝑘1,𝑡
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴𝛼𝑘1,𝑡
1−𝛼 − 𝑐1,𝑡 + (1 − 𝛼)𝐴
𝛼𝑘1,𝑡
−𝛼 (∫ 𝜏𝑠
𝑡
0
𝑑𝑠 + 𝑧0) − 𝜏𝑡 − g̅𝑡𝑘1,𝑡 , 
 
where u1,t and c1,t are the utility function and per capita consumption, respectively, in 
Economy 1 in period t. Because  and  for i 
= 1, 2 (see Harashima, 2010, 2017a), 
 
𝑑𝑘1,𝑡
𝑑𝑡
= (
𝜛𝛼
𝑚v
)
𝛼
(1 − 𝛼)−𝛼𝑘1,𝑡 − 𝑐1,𝑡                 
       + (
𝜛𝛼
𝑚v
)
𝛼
(1 − 𝛼)1−𝛼 (∫ 𝜏𝑠
𝑡
0
𝑑𝑠 + 𝑧0) − 𝜏𝑡 − g̅𝑡𝑘1,𝑡 . 
 
Similarly, each household in Economy 2 maximizes its expected utility 
 
𝐸 ∫ 𝑢2(𝑐2,𝑡)exp
∞
0
(−𝜃2𝑡)𝑑𝑡 
 
subject to 
  ti,t
k
αmν
α
A


1
   α
α
ti,
ti,
α
mν
α
k
y 








 1
1

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𝑑𝑘2,𝑡
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐴𝛼𝑘2,𝑡
1−𝛼 − 𝑐2,𝑡 − (1 − 𝛼)𝐴
𝛼𝑘2,𝑡
−𝛼 (∫ 𝜏𝑠
𝑡
0
𝑑𝑠 + 𝑧0) + 𝜏𝑡 + g̅𝑡𝑘2,𝑡 . 
 
where u2,t and c2,t are the utility function and per capita consumption, respectively, in 
Economy 2 in period t. Also, because  and  
for i = 1, 2, 
 
𝑑𝑘2,𝑡
𝑑𝑡
= (
𝜛𝛼
𝑚v
)
𝛼
(1 − 𝛼)−𝛼𝑘2,𝑡 − 𝑐2,𝑡 − 𝑧̅𝑘2,𝑡                 
−(
𝜛𝛼
𝑚v
)
𝛼
(1 − 𝛼)1−𝛼 (∫ 𝜏𝑠
𝑡
0
𝑑𝑠 + 𝑧0) + 𝜏𝑡 + g̅𝑡𝑘2,𝑡 . 
 
 As a result of optimizations, the consumption growth rate in Economy 1 can be 
expressed as  
 
?̇?1,𝑡
𝑐1,𝑡
= 𝜀−1
[
 
 
 
 
(
𝜛𝛼
𝑚v
)
𝛼
(1 − 𝛼)−𝛼 + (
𝜛𝛼
𝑚v
)
𝛼
(1 − 𝛼)1−𝛼
𝜕 (∫ 𝜏𝑠
𝑡
0
𝑑𝑠 + 𝑧0)
𝜕𝑘1,𝑡
−
𝜕𝜏𝑡
𝜕𝑘1,𝑡
− 𝜃1 − g̅𝑡 ]
 
 
 
 
    (2) 
 
and that in Economy 2 as 
 
?̇?2,𝑡
𝑐2,𝑡
= 𝜀−1
[
 
 
 
 
(
𝜛𝛼
𝑚v
)
𝛼
(1 − 𝛼)−𝛼 − (
𝜛𝛼
𝑚v
)
𝛼
(1 − 𝛼)1−𝛼
𝜕 (∫ 𝜏𝑠
𝑡
0
𝑑𝑠 + 𝑧0)
𝜕𝑘2,𝑡
+
𝜕𝜏𝑡
𝜕𝑘2,𝑡
− 𝜃2 + g̅𝑡 ]
 
 
 
 
 .       (3) 
 
4.1.2  Multilateral path without any government intervention 
First, I examine the case where households in Economy 1 behave multilaterally. Suppose 
that the government does not intervene with regard to both heterogeneous time preference 
and rent income. That is, g̅
𝑡
= 0 for any period. By the same procedures as those for 
Proposition 1-1, Proposition 2-1, and Lemma 3-1 in the work of Harashima (2010, 2017a), 
if SH is satisfied,  
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lim
𝑡→∞
 
𝑐1̇,𝑡
𝑐1,𝑡
 = lim
𝑡→∞
 
𝑐2̇,𝑡
𝑐2,𝑡
                        (4) 
 
and 
lim
𝑡→∞
 
𝜏𝑡
𝑘1,𝑡
 = lim
𝑡→∞
 
𝜏𝑡
𝑘2,𝑡
 = 𝛯 ,                                              (5) 
 
where Ξ is a constant. In this case, if  
 
(
𝜛𝛼
𝑚v
)
𝛼
(1 − 𝛼)−𝛼[1 − (1 − 𝛼)𝜀] <
𝜃1 + 𝜃2
2
 ,                  (6) 
 
then 
 
 𝛯 =
𝜃1 − 𝜃2
2
{𝜀 (
𝜛𝛼
𝑚v
)
𝛼
(1 − 𝛼)1−𝛼 [(
𝜛𝛼
𝑚v
)
𝛼
(1 − 𝛼)−𝛼 −
𝜃1 + 𝜃2
2
]
−1
− 1}
−1
< 0 . 
 
This balanced growth path is called a “multilateral path,” and it satisfies the conditions 
for SH. Note that condition (6) is generally satisfied for reasonable parameter values.  
 Therefore, even though the government does not intervene, if each household in 
Economy 1 sets its initial consumption so as to satisfy equations (4) and (5) (i.e., if they 
behave multilaterally), SH is achieved.  
 
4.1.3  Unilateral path without government intervention in rent incomes  
Next, I examine the case where households in Economy 1 behave unilaterally, which I 
call the “unilateral path.” Suppose that, although the government intervenes with regard 
to heterogeneous time preference, it does not intervene for the purpose of dealing with 
rent incomes. That is, it intervenes so as to satisfy  
 
(
𝜛𝛼
𝑚v
)
𝛼
(1 − 𝛼)1−𝛼 lim
𝑡→∞
𝜕 (∫ 𝜏𝑠
𝑡
0
𝑑𝑠)
𝜕𝑘1,𝑡
= lim
𝑡→∞
𝜕𝜏𝑡
𝜕𝑘1,𝑡
 ,                          (7) 
 
(
𝜛𝛼
mv
)
𝛼
(1 − 𝛼)1−𝛼 lim
𝑡→∞
𝜕 (∫ 𝜏𝑠
𝑡
0
𝑑𝑠)
𝜕𝑘2,𝑡
= lim
𝑡→∞
𝜕𝜏𝑡
𝜕𝑘2,𝑡
 ,                          (8) 
 
and 
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lim
𝑡→∞
g̅
𝑡
=
𝜃2 − 𝜃1
2
                          (9) 
 
as shown by Harashima (2012). 
 In this case, because 
𝜕𝑧0
𝜕𝑘2,𝑡
 = 0,  
 
lim
𝑡→∞
?̇?1,𝑡
𝑐1,𝑡
= lim
𝑡→∞
?̇?2,𝑡
𝑐2,𝑡
=𝜀−1 [(
𝜛𝛼
𝑚v
)
𝛼
(1 − 𝛼)−𝛼 −
𝜃1 + 𝜃2
2
] = constant           (10) 
 
by equations (2) and (3). Equation (10) holds regardless of the multilateral or unilateral 
behavior of households in Economy 1. That is, even if households in Economy 1 behave 
unilaterally and the government intervenes with regard to heterogeneous time preference 
(but does nothing about rent incomes), SH can be achieved.  
 Equation (10) is the same as equation (1), and it shows the case where there is 
no rent income. Therefore, even with temporary rent income, SH is eventually achieved 
by the government’s appropriate manipulation of the value of g̅  with regard to 
heterogeneous time preference, exactly in the same manner as in the case without rent 
income shown in Section 3.   
 
4.2  SH with persistent rent incomes 
As discussed in Section, 2.2.3, some family lines (indefinitely living households) can 
obtain rent incomes persistently over generations. Persistent rent incomes may be 
obtained deterministically or stochastically (e.g., some generations obtain relatively large 
amounts of them but other generations obtain relatively small ones). In this section, I 
examine the case where households in Economy 1 persistently obtain rent incomes, 
whether deterministically or stochastically. 
 
4.2.1  Deterministic case   
4.2.1.1 Consumption growth 
Suppose that a household in Economy 1 obtains rent income zt in period t, and conversely, 
the income of a household in Economy 2 is reduced by zt in period t. Suppose again for 
simplicity that a household in Economy 1 does not consume zt in period t but lends the 
money equivalent to zt to a household in Economy 2 in period t. Because zt is composed 
of ranking monopoly rents, it is assumed to be proportional to ki,t such that  
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𝑧𝑡 = 𝑧̅𝑘1,𝑡 ,                           (11) 
 
where 𝑧̅ (> 0) is a constant. A positive value of 𝑧̅ means that the mean of monopoly 
rents that households (family lines) in Economy 1 obtain over generations is positive 
because of the reasons shown in Section 2.2.3. Equation (11) means that rent income zt is 
not a stochastic variable and households in Economy 1 obtain rent incomes 
deterministically in every period.  
 Each household in Economy 1 maximizes its expected utility 
 
𝐸 ∫ 𝑢1(𝑐1,𝑡)exp
∞
0
(−𝜃1𝑡)𝑑𝑡 
 
subject to 
 
𝑑𝑘1,𝑡
𝑑𝑡
= (
𝜛𝛼
𝑚v
)
𝛼
(1 − 𝛼)−𝛼𝑘1,𝑡 − 𝑐1,𝑡 + 𝑧̅𝑘1,𝑡 + (
𝜛𝛼
𝑚v
)
𝛼
(1 − 𝛼)1−𝛼 ∫ 𝜏𝑠
𝑡
0
𝑑𝑠 
      −𝜏𝑡 − g̅𝑡𝑘1,𝑡 .                                                         
 
On the other hand, each household in Economy 2 maximizes its expected utility  
 
𝐸 ∫ 𝑢2(𝑐2,𝑡)exp
∞
0
(−𝜃2𝑡)𝑑𝑡 
 
subject to 
 
𝑑𝑘2,𝑡
𝑑𝑡
= (
𝜛𝛼
𝑚v
)
𝛼
(1 − 𝛼)−𝛼𝑘2,𝑡 − 𝑐2,𝑡 − 𝑧̅𝑘2,𝑡 − (
𝜛𝛼
𝑚v
)
𝛼
(1 − 𝛼)1−𝛼 ∫ 𝜏𝑠
𝑡
0
𝑑𝑠 
+𝜏𝑡 + g̅𝑡𝑘2,𝑡 .                                                   
 
 As a result of optimizations, the consumption growth rate in Economy 1 is 
 
 
?̇?1,𝑡
𝑐1,𝑡
= 𝜀−1
[
 
 
 
 
(
𝜛𝛼
𝑚v
)
𝛼
(1 − 𝛼)−𝛼 + 𝑧̅ + (
𝜛𝛼
𝑚v
)
𝛼
(1 − 𝛼)1−𝛼
𝜕 (∫ 𝜏𝑠𝑑𝑠
𝑡
0
)
𝜕𝑘1,𝑡
−
𝜕𝜏𝑡
𝜕𝑘1,𝑡
− 𝜃1 − g̅𝑡 ]
 
 
 
 
 , 
 
and that in Economy 2 is 
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?̇?2,𝑡
𝑐2,𝑡
= 𝜀−1
[
 
 
 
 
(
𝜛𝛼
𝑚v
)
𝛼
(1 − 𝛼)−𝛼 − 𝑧̅ − (
𝜛𝛼
𝑚v
)
𝛼
(1 − 𝛼)1−𝛼
𝜕 (∫ 𝜏𝑠𝑑𝑠
𝑡
0
)
𝜕𝑘2,𝑡
+
𝜕𝜏𝑡
𝜕𝑘2,𝑡
− 𝜃2 + g̅𝑡 ]
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
4.2.1.2  Multilateral path without government intervention 
First, I examine the case where households in Economy 1 behave multilaterally, and the 
government does not intervene with regard to either heterogeneous time preference or 
rent income (i.e., g̅
𝑡
= 0) for any period.  
 By the same procedures used in Proposition 1-1, Proposition 2-1, and Lemma 3-
1 of Harashima (2010, 2017a), if SH is satisfied, equations (4) and (5) hold. In this case, 
if condition (6) is satisfied, then 
 
𝛯 = (
𝜃1 − 𝜃2
2
− 𝑧̅) {𝜀 (
𝜛𝛼
𝑚v
)
𝛼
(1 − 𝛼)1−𝛼 [(
𝜛𝛼
𝑚v
)
𝛼
(1 − 𝛼)−𝛼 −
𝜃1 + 𝜃2
2
]
−1
− 1}
−1
< 0 . 
 
 Therefore, in the cases of both temporary and persistent rent incomes, SH is 
achieved even though the government does not intervene if households in Economy 1 
behave multilaterally in the sense that each household in Economy 1 sets its initial 
consumption so as to satisfy equations (4) and (5).  
 
4.2.1.3  Unilateral path without government intervention in rent incomes  
Next, I examine the case where households in Economy 1 behave unilaterally. Suppose 
that the government intervenes only with regard to heterogeneous time preference and, 
therefore, it intervenes so as to hold equations (7), (8), and (9). In this case, by equations 
(2), (3), (7), (8), and (9), 
 
lim
𝑡→∞
?̇?1,𝑡
𝑐1,𝑡
= 𝜀−1 [(
𝜛𝛼
𝑚v
)
𝛼
(1 − 𝛼)−𝛼 + 𝑧̅ −
𝜃1 + 𝜃2
2
] 
 
and  
 
 lim
𝑡→∞
?̇?2,𝑡
𝑐2,𝑡
= 𝜀−1 [(
𝜛𝛼
𝑚v
)
𝛼
(1 − 𝛼)−𝛼 − 𝑧̅ −
𝜃1 + 𝜃2
2
]  . 
 
 Because 𝑧̅ > 0,  
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lim
𝑡→∞
?̇?1,𝑡
𝑐1,𝑡
> lim
𝑡→∞
?̇?2,𝑡
𝑐2,𝑡
 
 
and therefore, it is not possible for all optimality conditions of households in Economy 2 
to be satisfied even though all optimality conditions of households in Economy 1 are 
satisfied. This result is the same as in the cases of heterogeneous time preference and risk 
aversion shown by Harashima (2010, 2017a). That is, in the case of persistent rent 
incomes, if households in Economy 1 behave unilaterally and the government does not 
appropriately intervene, then households in Economy 2 will eventually fall into a 
devastated state that is similar to that described by Becker (1980). Persistent rent incomes 
that are heterogeneously endowed across economies can therefore be an important 
obstacle to achieving SH.  
 
4.2.1.4  Unilateral path with government intervention in both heterogeneous time 
preference and rent income 
Next, I examine the case where households in Economy 1 behave unilaterally and the 
government intervenes with regard to both heterogeneous time preference and rent 
income. In this case, if the government appropriately manipulates the value of g̅ in every 
period during the transition period before achieving SH so as to hold equations (4), (7), 
and (8), then  
 
lim
𝑡→∞
?̇?1,𝑡
𝑐1,𝑡
= 𝜀−1 [(
𝜛𝛼
𝑚v
)
𝛼
(1 − 𝛼)−𝛼 − 𝜃1 + 𝑧̅ − lim
𝑡→∞
g̅
𝑡
]  ,         (12) 
 
lim
𝑡→∞
?̇?2,𝑡
𝑐2,𝑡
= 𝜀−1 [(
𝜛𝛼
𝑚v
)
𝛼
(1 − 𝛼)−𝛼 − 𝜃2 − 𝑧̅ + lim
𝑡→∞
g̅
𝑡
]  ,                    (13) 
 
and equation (4) hold. Equations (4), (12), and (13) indicate that, to achieve SH, the 
government has to manipulate the value of g̅ such that  
 
lim
𝑡→∞
g̅
𝑡
= 𝑧̅ +
𝜃2 − 𝜃1
2
= constant .                                       (14) 
 
Unlike in equation (9), 𝑧̅ is included in equation (14). To achieve SH, the government 
has to transfer the persistent rent income (𝑧𝑡 = 𝑧̅𝑘1,𝑡)  entirely from a household in 
Economy 1 to households in Economy 2 in every period.1 If the government transfers 
                                                     
1 Households in Economy 2 share the transfer equally with each other. 
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rent income in this way, the consumption growth rate will become identical for both 
economies, such that   
 
lim
𝑡→∞
?̇?1,𝑡
𝑐1,𝑡
= lim
𝑡→∞
?̇?2,𝑡
𝑐2,𝑡
=𝜀−1 [(
𝜛𝛼
𝑚v
)
𝛼
(1 − 𝛼)−𝛼 −
𝜃1 + 𝜃2
2
]  .                  (15) 
 
Equation (15) is identical to equation (1); that is, it shows the consumption growth rate in 
the case of no rent income. By intervening in this way, the government can remove the 
obstacle to achieving SH.  
 Note that in the case of multiple economies such that there are H economies 
(Economy 1, Economy 2, …, Economy H) that are identical except for rate of time 
preference and rent income and that only Economy H obtains rent income, as Harashima 
(2012) showed for an analogous case, SH requires government (positive or negative) 
transfers from a household in Economy 1+2+ ∙ ∙ ∙ + (H – 1) to households in Economy H 
by 
 
 lim
𝑡→∞
g̅
𝑡
=
𝜃𝐻 −
∑ 𝜃𝑞
𝐻−1
𝑞=1
2
𝐻 − 1
−
𝑧̅
𝐻 − 1
 , 
 
where Economy 1+2+ ∙ ∙ ∙ + (H – 1) is the combined economy of Economy 1, Economy 
2, …, and Economy (H -1), and SH is satisfied among these economies.2 In this case, 
conversely, the amount of government (positive or negative) transfers from a household 
in Economy H to households in Economy 1+2+ ∙ ∙ ∙ + (H – 1) is  
 
 −(𝐻 − 1) 𝑘1+2+⋯+(𝐻−1),𝑡 lim
𝑡→∞
g̅
𝑡
=  𝑘1+2+⋯+(𝐻−1),𝑡 [(
∑ 𝜃𝑞
𝐻−1
𝑞=1
2
−𝜃𝐻) + 𝑧̅]  , 
 
where 𝑘1+2+⋯+(𝐻−1),𝑡 is the capital of a household in Economy 1+2+ ∙ ∙ ∙ + (H – 1) in 
period t and is equal to 𝑘𝐻,𝑡.
3  
 
4.2.2  Stochastic case   
Finally, I examine the case where rent incomes are stochastically obtained. I do not 
examine the multilateral and unilateral paths without government intervention in rent 
income, because the results of these cases are the same as those in the above sections. 
                                                     
2 Households in Economy H share the transfers equally with each other. 
3 Households in Economy 1+2+ ∙ ∙ ∙ + (H – 1) share the transfer equally with each other. 
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That is, SH is achieved if households in Economy 1 behave multilaterally, and it is not 
achieved if households in Economy 1 behave unilaterally and the government intervenes 
only with regard to heterogeneous time preference. Hence, I only examine the case of the 
unilateral path with government intervention with regard to both heterogeneous time 
preference and rent income.  
Suppose that households in Economy 1 behave unilaterally and that the rent 
income zt that a household in Economy 1 obtains persistently in each period is a stochastic 
variable, such that  
 
 𝑧𝑡 = 𝑧̅(1 + 𝜀𝑡)𝑘1,𝑡 , 
 
where 𝑧̅ (> 0) is a constant and 𝜀𝑡 is an i.i.d. process with a zero mean. The other 
elements are the same as those in the deterministic case.  
 If the government manipulates the value of g̅ during the transition period before 
achieving SH so as to hold equations (4), (7), and (8), then  
 
lim
𝑡→∞
?̇?1,𝑡
𝑐1,𝑡
= 𝜀−1 [(
𝜛𝛼
𝑚v
)
𝛼
(1 − 𝛼)−𝛼 − 𝜃1 + 𝑧̅(1 + 𝜀𝑡) − lim
𝑡→∞
g̅
𝑡
]  ,            (16) 
 
lim
𝑡→∞
?̇?2,𝑡
𝑐2,𝑡
= 𝜀−1 [(
𝜛𝛼
𝑚v
)
𝛼
(1 − 𝛼)−𝛼 − 𝜃2 − 𝑧̅(1 + 𝜀𝑡) + lim
𝑡→∞
g̅
𝑡
]  ,            (17) 
 
and equation (4) hold. Equations (4), (16), and (17) indicate that, to achieve SH, the 
government has to manipulate the value of g̅ such that  
 
lim
𝑡→∞
g̅
𝑡
= 𝑧̅(1 + 𝜀𝑡) +
𝜃2 − 𝜃1
2
 .                                          (18) 
 
The government therefore has to indefinitely change g̅
𝑡
 largely in each period according 
to the value of 𝜀𝑡 in equation (18). 
 Nevertheless, in both the deterministic and stochastic cases, the equation  
 
𝐸 (lim
𝑡→∞
?̇?1,𝑡
𝑐1,𝑡
) = 𝐸 (lim
𝑡→∞
?̇?2,𝑡
𝑐2,𝑡
) = 𝜀−1 [(
𝜛𝛼
𝑚v
)
𝛼
(1 − 𝛼)−𝛼 −
𝜃1 + 𝜃2
2
]      (19) 
 
commonly holds where E is the expectation operator. The right side of equation (19) is 
identical to those of equations (1) and (15). That is, even if the government does not 
intervene according to equation (18) but instead according to equation (14) (i.e., in the 
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same manner as in the deterministic case) and thus does not change the value of g̅
𝑡
 
largely in each period indefinitely, the result in the long run in the stochastic case is the 
same as that in the deterministic case. That is, there is no need for a government to change 
the value of g̅
𝑡
 largely in each period indefinitely to maintain SH, even in the stochastic 
case. 
 Note that in the case of multiple economies (as shown in Section 4.2.1.4), SH 
requires a government (positive or negative) transfer from a household in Economy 1+2+ 
∙ ∙ ∙ + (H – 1) to households in Economy H by 
 
 lim
𝑡→∞
g̅
𝑡
=
𝜃𝐻−
∑ 𝜃𝑞
𝐻−1
𝑞=1
2
𝐻−1
− ?̅?(1+𝜀𝑡)
𝐻−1
 ,4 
 
and conversely, the amount of government (positive or negative) transfers from a 
household in Economy H to households in Economy 1+2+ ∙ ∙ ∙ + (H – 1) is  
 
 −(𝐻 − 1) 𝑘1+2+⋯+(𝐻−1),𝑡 lim
𝑡→∞
g̅
𝑡
=  𝑘1+2+⋯+(𝐻−1),𝑡 [(
∑ 𝜃𝑞
𝐻−1
𝑞=1
2
−𝜃𝐻) + 𝑧̅(1 + 𝜀𝑡)]  .
5 
 
5  ACHIEVING SH WITH RENT INCOMES 
 
5.1  Necessary government interventions 
Section 4 indicates that if rent incomes are temporary, a government need not intervene 
with regard to the income, but if they are persistent—whether deterministic or 
stochastic—a government needs to intervene appropriately to achieve and maintain SH. 
Therefore, what a government must first do is to distinguish whether rent incomes are 
temporary or persistent. If the government judges that they are temporary, it needs to take 
no action. However, if it deems them to be persistent, it then has to correctly evaluate 
their mean (i.e., 𝑧̅) and intervene appropriately on the basis of this estimated value. Note 
that, as discussed in Sections 3 and 4, the two-economy model used in this paper can be 
easily extended to multi-economy models, and the role of government in multi-economy 
models is basically the same as that in the two-economy model.   
 As mentioned in the Introduction, monopoly rents derived from ranking 
currently prevail and will continue to prevail indefinitely in the future because the strategy 
of product differentiation is one of the most important strategies for firms (Porter, 1980, 
                                                     
4 Households in Economy H share the transfers equally with each other. 
5 Households in Economy 1+2+ ∙ ∙ ∙ + (H – 1) share the transfer equally with each other. 
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1985). The economic importance of other types of rent incomes may have decreased and 
may continue to decrease in the future as industrialized economies develop, but the 
economic importance of ranking monopoly rents will not decrease, or may even increase, 
because the strategy of product differentiation almost certainly will continue to be 
important. Because of this, it is very important for a government to intervene according 
to either equation (14) or (18) to achieve SH in an economy with rent incomes—
particularly ranking monopoly rents.  
 In addition, as discussed in the previous sections, because of the nature of 
ranking preference, ranking monopoly rents will be very unevenly distributed to 
households. Moreover, some family lines can obtain them persistently because of their 
relatively high abilities or because of the prevailing system of distribution. In addition, 
most of the ranking monopoly rents generated in a company and systematically 
distributed to a specific family line may be inherited across generations. In this way, only 
a small number of family lines may persistently obtain a large amount of rent income. 
Furthermore, as mentioned in Section 2.2.3 and shown by Harashima (2018c), there is no 
harm to economic activities even if ranking monopoly rents are collected and 
redistributed by the government. In sum, the government’s role to achieve SH in an 
economy with rent income (particularly ranking monopoly rents) by intervening 
according to equation (14) or (18) is both important and indispensable. 
 
5.2  Heterogeneity in people’s abilities can accelerate inequality 
The heterogeneous persistent rent income model has the same nature as heterogeneous 
time preference, risk aversion, and productivity models in that they commonly assume 
that heterogeneity among indefinitely living households (family lines) is kept indefinitely. 
The heterogeneous persistent rent income and productivity models also have the common 
feature that heterogeneity in abilities of indefinitely living households is kept indefinitely. 
However, the necessity for government intervention to achieve SH is entirely different in 
these two ability-related models. Harashima (2010, 2012, 2017a) showed that, in the case 
of heterogeneous productivities, government interventions are not necessary to achieve 
SH because households in Economy 1 will spontaneously choose the multilateral path, 
and therefore SH will be naturally achieved. This means that heterogeneity in people’s 
abilities with regard to productivity will not result in acceleration of inequality. In this 
paper, I showed that heterogeneity in people’s abilities with regard to access to ranking 
monopoly rents does accelerate inequality if governments do nothing. The reason for this 
difference is explained below. 
 Suppose a two-economy heterogeneous productivity model consists of Economy 
1 and Economy 2 (see Harashima, 2010, 2017a). Furthermore, the two economies are 
 22 
identical except for their productivities, such that the production function of Economy 1 
is 𝑦1,𝑡 = 𝜔1
𝛼𝐴𝑡
𝛼𝑓(𝑘1,𝑡) and that of Economy 2 is 𝑦2,𝑡 = 𝜔2
𝛼𝐴𝑡
𝛼𝑓(𝑘2,𝑡), where 𝜔1(0 <
𝜔1 ≤ 1) and 𝜔2(0 < 𝜔2 ≤ 1) are constants and 𝜔2 < 𝜔1. Harashima (2010, 2017a) 
showed that, regardless of whether households in Economy 1 behave unilaterally or 
multilaterally,  
 
lim
𝑡→∞
?̇?1,𝑡
𝑐1,𝑡
= lim
𝑡→∞
?̇?2,𝑡
𝑐2,𝑡
= 𝜀−1 {[
(𝜔1 + 𝜔2)𝜛𝛼
2𝑚v(1 − 𝛼)
]
𝛼
− 𝜃}            (20) 
 
holds, where θ is the common rate of time preference of the two economies. That is, 
equation (4) is naturally satisfied and SH is naturally achieved. Equations (4) and (20) 
naturally hold because capital is adjusted between the two economies to satisfy equation 
(4) through arbitration in markets, because the production functions and the returns on 
capital are heterogeneous between the two economies. That is, the model contains a 
market mechanism that adjusts capital to satisfy equation (4).  
 On the other hand, in the heterogeneous persistent rent income model, the 
production functions of the two economies are identical and therefore their returns on 
capital are also identical, similar to the heterogeneous time preference and risk aversion 
models. Hence, there is no capital adjustment mechanism in markets with regard to rent 
income to satisfy equation (4) in the process of production. The difference between the 
two economies emerges only after outputs are produced, and these two economies differ 
in how the produced outputs are distributed, consumed, and invested. Because equation 
(4) is not yet satisfied, appropriate government interventions are necessary in the 
processes of distribution, consumption, and investment to achieve SH when households 
in Economy 1 behave unilaterally. 
 From the point of view of productivity, therefore, heterogeneous abilities do not 
accelerate inequality, as Harashima (2010, 2017a) showed. They produce a certain level 
of inequality in that people’s incomes are determined to be proportionate to their absolute 
abilities (productivities), but the level of inequality is uniquely determined and inequality 
will not accelerate. Hence, some people may argue that the current level of inequality 
simply reflects the proportional differences in people’s absolute abilities and therefore is 
justifiable. However, as shown in this paper, heterogeneity in people’s abilities actually 
can accelerate inequality through heterogeneous access to persistent rent incomes—
particularly ranking monopoly rents—and the inequality can reach an extreme level. 
Appropriate government interventions are significantly important for the level of 
inequality to be stabilized at a proper level—that is, for SH to be achieved. 
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6  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
There has been a long-held and deep-rooted view that wealthy persons can exclusively 
obtain high incomes irrespective of their absolute abilities because of economic rents. 
However, most traditional economic rents may currently be less economically important 
even though there is still significant income inequality in most countries, indicating that 
there may be another important type of economic rent.   
 In this paper, ranking monopoly rents were examined on the basis of the model 
of ranking value and preference and the concept of SH. Ranking preference generates 
monopoly powers, profits, and rents, and these monopoly rents can be obtained through 
product differentiation. Because product differentiation is one of the most important 
strategies for firms and is actually pursued intensely by many firms, these monopoly rents 
are large and widespread across economies.  
 Access to ranking monopoly rents will largely differ among people, depending 
on their inherited relative abilities or because some system of uneven distribution exists. 
Hence, ranking monopoly rents will be very unevenly distributed among households; that 
is, only a small number of households (and family lines) will be able to frequently access 
them. Unlike heterogeneity in productivity, heterogeneous accessibility to ranking 
monopoly rents among households does not necessarily guarantee SH. If advantaged 
households behave unilaterally and the government does not intervene, inequality will 
accelerate and eventually reach an extreme level. 
 Because ranking monopoly rents can be an important factor for widening 
inequality, a government bears the responsibility to prevent the increasing inequality and 
to achieve SH by appropriately dealing with heterogeneous rent incomes as well as 
heterogeneous rates of time preference and degrees of risk aversion. 
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